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Abstract—Government information is a vital asset that must 
be kept in a trusted environment and efficiently managed by 
authorised parties. Even though e-Government provides a 
number of advantages, it also introduces a range of new security 
risks. Sharing confidential and top-secret information in a secure 
manner among government sectors tends to be the main element 
that government agencies look for. Thus, developing an effective 
methodology is essential and it is a key factor for e-Government 
success. The proposed e-Government scheme in this paper is a 
combination of identity-based encryption and biometric 
technology. This new scheme can effectively improve the security 
in authentication systems, which provides a reliable identity with 
a high degree of assurance. This paper also demonstrates the 
feasibility of using finite-state machines as a formal method to 
analyse the proposed protocols. Finally we showed how Petri Nets 
could be used to simulate the communication patterns between 
the server and client as well as to validate the protocol 
functionality. 
Keywords—e-Government; identity-based cryptosystem; 
biometrics; mutual authentication; finite-state machine; Petri net. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
e-Government mainly acts as a communication bridge, 
whether from government to citizen, government to 
government, or government to business, in efficient and 
reliable ways through effective use of information  technology. 
The main challenge in e-government is to develop a 
framework which promotes exchanging data securely among 
government agencies. While e-government provides a number 
of advantages, it also introduces a range of new security risks. 
Sharing confidential and top-secret information in a secure 
manner among government sectors tend to be the main 
element that government agencies look for. 
When e-Government systems were being designed, Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) seemed to be the best solution for the 
scheme. PKI is presently deployed in most e-Government 
implementations, as it is perceived as a mature technology, 
which is widely supported and can be easily integrated with 
different systems. Examples of          e-government initiatives 
that apply PKI on a large scale are the US eGov initiative 
(www.usa.gov) supported by Federal PKI [1] and the Saudi 
Arabian e-Government Program (yesser.gov.sa) [2].  
One of the main issues concerning the security perspective 
in e-Government is to grant access to authorised users as well 
as the need to verify that the user is really who they claim to 
be. The most common solution to this problem is to deploy a 
PKI [3] and digital signatures in large-scale e-Government 
systems. Even though PKI supports strong authentication and 
digital signature, it has a few disadvantages. For example, 
users must be pre-enrolled, certificate directories can leak 
some critical information, key recovery is difficult and costly 
and boundary services (anti-spam, anti-virus, archiving) 
integration is very difficult [4]. 
Thus, to take full advantage of the capabilities of e-
Government, end users need robust security solutions to 
achieve assurance when dealing with e-Government systems. 
A variant of public key cryptography that derives public keys 
directly from unique identity information (such as an e-mail 
address) known by the user is called Identity-Based 
Cryptography (IBC).  This approach has recently received 
considerable attention from researchers [5, 6, 7, 8, 9], as the 
development of ID-Based Cryptography offers great flexibility 
and obviates the requirement for user certificates, since the 
identity of the user can be transformed into encryption keys 
and used for authentication. 
To develop a new secure cryptosystem for e-Government, 
several schemes were investigated to determine which 
protocol would be suitable for the research. We propose a 
biometric-ID-based scheme using Elliptic Curve 
Cryptosystem (ECC), which is an improved combination 
scheme derived from two schemes [10, 11].  The proposed 
scheme is secure under the Computational Diffie–Hellman 
Assumption (CDHA) and tackles the security drawbacks of He 
et al.’s scheme and Li and Hwang’s scheme. To overcome 
these, we applied a symmetric key cryptosystem to prevent 
attackers from altering or gaining any important information in 
the login and authentication messages. 
The structure of this paper is organised as follows. In 
Section 2, we review related works on ID-Based Cryptography 
and Biometric authentication and briefly describe both He et 
al.’s and Li and Hwang’s schemes. In Section 3, we design the 
new Biometric-ID-based Authentication Scheme. In Section 4, 
we model the new protocol with finite-state machines. In 
Section 5, we model the new protocol with Petri Nets to 
simulate the communication. We then provide a brief 
discussion on security analysis and comparisons with related 
schemes in Section 6. Finally, the conclusion is given in 
Section 7. 
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II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORK
Without a secure and trusted infrastructure, organisations 
such as governments would leave data electronically 
unsecured and vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, governments 
are constantly looking for ways to deliver secure and reliable 
services. ID-Based Cryptography introduces a lightweight key 
management and offers encryption for data confidentiality and 
robust authentication, which are prerequisites for securing 
high-value transactions.  
The idea of ID-based cryptography was originally 
proposed by Shamir in 1984 [12], but practical ID-based 
encryption schemes were not developed until recently. In 
2001, Boneh & Franklin [5] developed a fully functional ID-
based encryption scheme which can be constructed efficiently 
by using Weil pairing on elliptic curves.             In ID-based 
cryptosystems, there is a trusted third party called a Private 
Key Generator (PKG) who is responsible for generating the 
secret keys for all users. As a result, a PKG holds the users’ 
private keys. If a PKG is malicious, it can impersonate any 
user and therefore decrypt any cipher text or forge signature 
on any message. This can lead to a problem known as key 
escrow [13, 14]. 
There is no question that the Identity-Based Encryption 
(IBE) scheme brings many advantages such as eliminating the 
need to distribute public keys. The enforcement of the private 
key generation by the Private Key Generator raises concerns 
of key escrow and/or privacy surrounding the management of 
private keys. To address this particular problem of key escrow, 
an implementation of biometric identification systems can be 
used as a private key.  Biometric technology and verification 
systems offer a number of benefits to government sectors and 
users [15, 16]. 
He et al. [10] proposed an ID-based remote mutual 
authentication with key agreement scheme on ECC. This 
protocol attempts to cope with many of the well-known 
security and efficiency problems. However, the scheme has a 
potential flaw that may lead to man-in-the-middle attack and 
impersonation attack [17, 18]. It can be seen that, if an attacker 
E eavesdrops and listens to the communication between Si and 
Ci, then E can intercept a valid login request M1={IDCi, TCi ,
M, MACk(IDCi, TCi ,M)} or h(IDi || Xs) and masquerade as a
legal user. 
Biometric technologies are becoming fundamental 
elements in ensuring highly secure identification and personal 
verification solutions [15]. Biometric keys can be extracted 
from keystroke patterns, the human voice [19], fingerprints 
[20, 21], handwritten signatures [22], and facial characteristics 
[23]. 
Li and Hwang [11] proposed an efficient biometrics-based 
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. The 
security of their scheme is based on one-way hash functions, 
biometric verification, smart card and it uses a nonce. The 
scheme is very efficient in computation cost, which has been 
proved to be relatively low compared with other related 
schemes [24, 25, 26, 27]. The scheme is composed of four 
phases: the registration phase, the login phase, the 
authentication phase and password change phase.  
One of the key characteristics of the cryptographic hash 
function is that the outputs are very sensitive to small 
perturbations in their inputs. Hash functions cannot be applied 
directly when the input data are noisy such as biometrics [28]. 
Therefore, a secure one-way hash function cannot be used for 
biometric verification.  In the login phase of Li-Hwang’s 
scheme, the user computes h(Bi) based on a personal biometric 
template Bi. Then the biometric authentication process relies 
on comparing the hash value h(Bi) with fi . However, the 
scheme does not seem to be able to handle natural variation in 
the biometrics. For example, when the user logs in, his fresh 
biometric sample has to match exactly the template recorded 
during the registration phase, which never happens in practice. 
Thus, the protocol is fundamentally flawed and does not fulfil 
the basic objectives of a biometric authentication protocol. As 
a result, this may prevent a legal user from passing biometric 
verification at the login phase. So, Li-Hwang’s scheme is 
vulnerable to denial-of-service attack. The scheme is also 
prone to man-in-the-middle attack and impersonation attack. 
The attacker can cheat the server by impersonating the user or 
can impersonate the server to cheat the user without knowing 
any secret information [29, 30, 31] 
Combining ID based cryptography with biometric 
techniques can effectively improve the security in 
authentication systems, which provides a reliable identity with 
a high degree of assurance. The biometric technology is 
regarded as a powerful solution due to its unique link to an 
individual identity, which almost impossible to fake. Thus, a 
biometric identity is an inherent trait, which will always 
remain with the person all the time. In another words, using 
biometric techniques in IBE will mean that the person will 
always have their private key available.  
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
This research will focus on secure e-Government systems 
and improve their authentication and communication. To 
guarantee the security of these distributed systems, biometrics 
verification and ID-based cryptography are used. The 
proposed protocol is based on the following assumptions: 
 We assume that shared secrets in registration phase will
never be disclosed.
 We assume that cryptographic algorithms are secure.
For example, it is impossible to decrypt a ciphertext
without prior knowledge of the secret key.
 We assume that both client and server are able to
generate a random number securely.
The security of the proposed scheme is based on the 
intractability of the following two mathematical problems on 
elliptic curves [5, 10]: 
(i) Computational Diffie–Hellman Assumption (CDHA): 
Given P, xP, yP ∈ G, it is hard to compute xyP ∈ G. 
(ii) Collision Attack Assumption 1 (k-CAA1): For an 
integer k, and x∈ Zn*, P ∈ G ,given 
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(P, xP, h0, (h1, (h1+x)
-1P),….,(hk, (hk+x
)-1P)) , where hi
∈ Zn*,  and distinct for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, it is hard to compute 
(h0+x)
-1P.
The proposed scheme consists of four phases: system 
initialising phase, registration phase, login phase, and 
authentication phase. The notations used throughout this paper 
are summarised in Table 1. 
TABLE.I. NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER 
Symbol Definition 
Ci User/Client /Computer 
Si Server 
Ri Registration Centre 
IDS
i
Identity of Server 
IDC
i
Identity of user C 
PWC
i
User’s password 
BioC
i
Biometric template of C 
Pub_K Public Key 
Pr_K Private Key 
|| Message concatenation operation 
p, n Two large prime numbers 
Fp A finite field 
E An elliptic curve over a finite field F 
G The group of elliptic curve points on E 
P A point on elliptic curve E with order n 
xP Denotes point multiplication on elliptic curve  
y A piece of secret information maintained by the server 
(x, Pub_Ks) The server S’s Private/Public key pair, where 
Pub_Ks = xP 
rC
i 
, rS
i
A random number chosen by the Ci and Si respectively  
H(.) A secure one-way hash function  
MACk(m) The secure message authentication code of m under the 
key k 
XOR operation 
A. System initializing phase 
In this phase, we follow the steps in He et al.’s scheme 
where the server Si generates parameters of the system. 
Step 1: Si chooses an elliptic curve equation     EP(a, 
b). 
Step 2: Si selects a base point P with the order n over 
EP(a, b) 
Step 3: Si selects its master key x and secret 
information y and computes public key         Pub_Ks = 
xP 
Step 4: The server chooses four secure one-way hash 
functions H1(.), H2(.), H3(.), H4(.), where H(.) is a 
known hash function that takes a string and assigns it 
to a point on the elliptic curve, i.e. H(A) = QA on E, 
where C is usually based on the identity 
 H1(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H1:
{0, 1}* → Z*n
 H2(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H2:
{0, 1}* →  Z*p
 H3(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H3:
{0, 1}* →  Z*p
 H4(.):a secure one-way hash function, where H4:
{0, 1}* →  Z*p
The server also chooses a message authentication code 
MACk(m). Then, it keeps x private and publishes {Fp, E, n, P, 
Pub_Ks, H1, H2, H3, H4, MACk(m)}. 
B. Registration Phase 
A user Ci with identifier IDCi should be registered first
before using the services provided by Ri.  Users may use their 
employee number as an identity when contacting Ri for 
authorisation. In this phase, Ci needs to perform the following 
steps. 
Step 1: User Ci inputs their IDCi, personal biometrics
BioCi, on a specific biometric device, and provides the
password PWCi to Ri via a secure channel (or to the
registration centre in person). 
Step 2: Ri reads current timestamp TSi, and computes
the following: 
fi = H4(BioCi)
zi = H4(PWCi || fi)
ei = H4(IDCi || y)  zi 
Step 3: Ri computes Ci’s private key using the system 
private key x and Ci’s public key. 
Pr_KCi = (x+ H4 (IDCi))
-1 P ∈ G
Pub_KCi = H4 ((IDCi) + x) P =  H4 ((IDCi)P + Pub_Ks)
Step 4: Ri stores {IDCi, H4 (.), Enc{ }a/Dec{ }a, fi, ei,
τ, Pr_KCi} on a secure database and sends it to the
user via a secure channel, where                   Enc{ 
}a/Dec{ }a is a symmetric encryption with secret key 
a and and τ is a predetermined threshold [28] for 
biometric verification.  
C. Login Phase 
The user Ci sends a login request to the server Si and 
performs the following steps:  
Step 1: Ci enters the IDCi and PWCi, and then Si
verifies the authenticity of client’s identity and 
password.  
Step 2: Ci submits the BioCi on specific biometric
device, and then verifies the following: 
Accept if d(BioCi, Bio
*
Ci
)  < τ
Reject if d(BioCi, Bio
*
Ci
)  ≥ τ
Step 3: if the above does not hold, it means the 
biometric information does not match the template 
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stored in the system. Thus Ci does not pass the 
biometric verification process and the authentication 
scheme is terminated. Otherwise, Ci passes the 
biometric verification and computes the following:  
fi = H4 (BioCi)
   i
 = H4 (PWCi || fi)
M1 = ei  z  i  =  H4 (IDCi || y)
W1 =  rCi . P
M2 =  rCi . Pr_KCi
M3 =  M1  rCi 
Where rCi∈ Z
*
n is a random number generated by the user.
For this step, the random value rCi is introduced to mask the
hash of the secret value H4(IDCi || y).
Step 4: Ci computes k = H2 (IDCi, TCi, W1, M2), where
TCi is a timestamp denoting the current time.
Step 5: Finally, Ci encrypts the message {IDCi, TCi,
W1, M3, MACk(IDCi, TCi, W1, M3)}a and sends it to the
server Si. 
D. Authentication Phase 
After receiving the request login message, Si and Ci will 
perform the following steps for mutual authentication. 
Step 1: Si decrypts the message {IDCi, TCi, W1, 
M3, MACk(IDCi, TCi, W1, M3)}a, then checks the 
validity of I  i and the freshness of   i.  he
freshness of   i is checked by performing    – TCi ≤ 
  , where    is the time when  i receives the above 
message and    is a valid time interval.  he case 
where IDCi is not valid or TCi is not fresh, then Si 
aborts the current session.  
Step 2: If Step 1 holds, Si computes the following:  
M2 =  (x + H1(IDCi)
-1  W1
= Pr_KCi . rCi
k = H2 (IDCi, TCi, W1, M2)
Si checks the integrity of MACk(IDCi, TCi,
W1, M3) with the key k. Si will quit the 
current session if the check produces a 
negative result. 
Step 3: If Step 2 holds, Si chooses a random number 
RSi ∈  Z*n and computes the following: 
M4 = H4 (IDCi || y)
W2 =  rSi . P
KSi =  rSi . W1 
The session key sk = H3 (IDCi, TCi, TSi, W1,
W2, KSi), where TSi is a timestamp denoting
the current time 
M5 = M3 M4 = rCi 
M6 = M4 rSi
M7 = H4(M3 || M5) 
Where M5 is the random value rCi of the user
Ci and only Si can unmask the value because 
it can compute H4 (IDCi  || y)
Step 4: Then, Si encrypts the message {IDCi, TSi, W2,
M6, M7, MACk(IDCi, TSi, W2, M6, M7)}a and sends it to
Ci 
Step 5: Upon receiving the Si’s message, Ci first 
decrypts {IDCi, TSi, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDCi, TSi, W2,
M6, M7)}a , and checks the freshness of TSi is by
performing T’– TSi ≤  T, where T  is the time when Ci
receives the above message and  T is the expected 
time interval for the transmission delay. 
Step 6: Ci verifies whether M7 ≟ H4 (M3 || rCi) and
checks the integrity of MACk(IDCi, TSi, W2, M6, M7)
with the key k. Ci will quit the current session if the 
check produces a negative result.  
Step 7: If it holds, Ci believes that Si is authenticated 
and then computes the following: 
KCi = rCi . W2 
The session key sk = H3(IDCi, TCi, TSi, W1,
W2, KCi)
M8 = M6 M1 = rSi 
M9 = H4(M6 || M8) 
Where M9 is the random value rSi of the server Si and only
the client Ci, which know M1 = H4 (IDCi|| y), can send back the
correct hashed value of M9 = H4 (H4 (IDCi|| y) rSi) || rSi)
Step 8: Ci sends the encrypted message             {M9, 
MACk(M9) }a to Si 
Step 9: After receiving Ci’s message, Si decrypts 
Enc{M9}a and check the integrity of MACk(M9). 
Then, Si verifies whether M9 ≟ H4 (M6 || rSi)
Step 10: If the above mentioned holds, Si accept Ci’s 
login request or otherwise rejects it 
IV. BEHAVIOUR MODELLING AND STATE MACHINE
Verification is a crucial step in designing security 
protocols. A Finite-State Machine (FSM) is a powerful tool to 
simulate software architecture and communication protocols. 
FSM can only model the control part of a system and consists 
of a finite number of states, finite number of events, and finite 
number of transitions. An FSM may be regarded as a five-
tuple [32]: (Q, ∑,  , σ, ԛ0), where: 
 Q: finite set of symbols denoting states
 ∑: set of symbols denoting the possible inputs
  : set of symbols denoting the possible outputs
 σ: transition function mapping to Qx∑ to Qx  
 ԛ0 є Q:  initial state.
The FSM is used to model the communication channel of 
proposed protocol between the Client Ci and the Server Si. 
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Since the exchange of packets follows a pattern defined by a 
finite set of rules, it will be described by creating three finite-
state machines FSMserver, FSMregister and FSMclient. 
A. Server FSM 
The FSM at the server side represents the various on-going 
communications with the client at any point of time. It is 
modelled using 10 states and 22 transitions as detailed below. 
Fig. 1 shows the transitions diagram for the FSMserver. 
1) The FSMserver will loop itself as the server is waiting for
clients. The machine advances to the next state once it is 
triggered by a login/enrol transition accordingly. 
2) When the FSMserver is in the state S1, it checks the
validity of the received ID. If ID proved to be incorrect, Si will 
request Ci to enter the valid ID for three times and FSMserver 
will loop until Ci enters the valid ID or if the attempts exceed 
three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s account will be blocked 
and FSMserver changes state to S4 from state S1. Generally, 
three attempts are made through our protocol steps to allow 
common errors. 
3) When the FSMserver is in the state S2, it is triggered by
valid ID and it is now waiting for a valid PW. Once Si receives 
PW, it verifies its validity. If PW proved to be wrong, Si will 
request Ci to enter the valid PW for three times and FSMserver 
will loop until Ci enters the valid PW or if the attempts exceed 
three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s account will be blocked 
and FSMserver changes state to S4 from state S2.  
4) When the FSMserver is in the state S3, it is triggered by
valid PW and it is now waiting for a valid Bio. Once Si 
receives Bio, it verifies its validity by comparing the imprinted 
Bio with the template stored. If Bio does not match the stored 
template, Si will request Ci to enter the valid Bio up to three 
times and the FSMserver will loop until Ci enters the valid PW 
or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s 
account will be blocked and the FSMserver changes state to S4 
from state S3. 
5) In state S5, the FSMserver waits until receiving the login
request SYN = {IDCi, TCi, W1, M3, MACk(IDCi, TCi, W1, M3)}a
from the FSMclient to establish a connection by performing 
three-ways-handshake.  
6) While in State S5, the FSMserver checks the validity of
ID, freshness of T and the integrity of MACk. Then Si generates 
a random number and timestamp in order to calculate the 
session key sk = H3(IDCi, TCi, TSi, W1, W2, KSi). After that, Si
replies SYN/ACK = {IDCi, TSi, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDCi, TSi, W2,
M6, M7)}a to the FSMclient. 
7) In state S6, FSMserver waits until receiving ACK from the
FSMclient. Once the FSMclient sends ACK = {M9}a, FSMserver 
verifies M9≟H4 (M6 || rSi). At this instance, Si authenticates Ci
as a legitimate user.  
8) At state S5 and state S6, FSMserver terminates the
current session if any of the following situations occurs: 
 The client ID is invalid
 The freshness of T  – TCi ≥  T
 Negative result when checking the integrity of
MACk(IDCi, TCi, W1, M3)
 If M9 != H4 (M6 || rSi)
At any stage of FSMserver, FSMserver aborts the current 
session and changes to state S9 if the timeout exceeds the 
defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. This feature 
helps to prevent an infinite wait when the FSMclient fails to 
response.  
B. Client FSM 
The FSM at the client side represents the various on-going 
transmissions with the server at any point of time. It is 
modelled using 9 states and 21 transitions as detailed below. 
Fig. 1 shows the transitions diagram for the FSMclient. 
1) First, the FSMclient is in the initial state C0 that is when
the request for register/login is initiated by itself. While in 
state C0, the FSMserver checks whether Ci is enrolled or not. 
The next state will  
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Fig.1. Proposed protocol FSM model 
be decided according to the condition ClientReg == True. 
2) In states C1, C2, C3, the FSMclient is waiting for
validating ID, PW, and Bio. Once the client credentials are 
validated, the FSMclient triggers itself and changes to state C5. 
3) In states C1, C2, C3, the client may require to re-enter
ID, PW, Bio in case if they were incorrect. However, the 
client’s account will be blocked if the number of attempts 
exceeds three trials, which change the above states to state 
C4.  
 ID_attempt < 3, ID_attempt = ID_attempt +1
 PW_attempt < 3, PW_attempt = PW_attempt +1
 Bio_Attempt  < 3, Bio_attempt = Bio_attempt +1
4) While in state C5, the FSMclient is waiting for the
FSMserver response after sending the login request to establish 
the connection. 
5) In state C6, the FSMclient is validating the FSMserver
response by checking the integrity of MACk, ∆T and M7 ≟ H4 
(M4 || rCi). If Si is proved to be honest, Ci authenticates Si at
this stage. 
6) While in state C6, the FSMclient computes the shared
session key sk = H3(IDCi, TCi, TSi, W1, W2, KCi) and finalises the
handshake procedure by sending ACK = {M9}a to Si. 
7) In state C7, the FSMclient is waiting to be authenticated
by Si. 
8) In state C8, the client terminates the current session if
one of the following occurs: 
 Negative result when checking the integrity of MACk
 The freshness of T  – TSi ≥  T
 M7 ≟ H4 (M4 || rCi)
At any stage of FSMclient, FSMclient aborts the current 
session and changes to state C9 if the timeout exceeds the 
defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. This feature 
helps to prevent an infinite wait when the FSMserver fails to 
response.     
C. Register FSM 
The FSM at Registration side represents the various on-
going transmissions with the server and client at any point of 
time. It is modelled using 4 states and 7 transitions as detailed 
below. Fig. 1 shows the transitions diagram for the FSMregister. 
1) First, the FSMregister is triggered if the client is not
enrolled R0, that is when the request for register is initiated by 
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FSMclient. While in state C0, the FSMserver checks whether Ci is 
enrolled. 
2) When once Ci enters ID, FSMregister changes to state R1
and validates the format of ID. FSMregister triggers itself. Then 
FSMregister asks Ci to enter PW and changes to state R2. 
3) In state R2, on receiving PW for the first time,
FSMregister requires Ci to re-enter PW for confirmation. Then it 
triggers and changes to the state R3. 
4) In state R3, Ci is required to submit multiple scans of
the biometric data to increase accuracy. Once the acquisition 
process is complete, FSMregister trigger itself and sends a 
message to R0, which indicates that the enrolment is 
successful. 
V. PROTOCOL  MODEL AND PETRI NETS 
Due to the unique characteristics possessed by 
cryptographic protocols, analysis and evaluation tend to be 
more difficult than normal protocols. Petri Nets (PN) [33] 
offer a way to simulate the communication patterns between 
the server and client as well as to validate the protocol 
functionality.  
Petri nets are a finite-state analysis approach that explicitly 
provides a graphical description for cryptographic protocols. 
The formal definition of a Petri net is shown in Table 2 [35]. 
Generally Petri nets focus on specific properties such as 
liveness, deadlock, livelock, boundedness and safeness 
[34,35,36]. Typically, a petri net must consist of the following 
components [35]: 
 A set of places (drawn as circles in the graphical
representation) represent conditions and possible states
of the system.
 A set of transitions (drawn as rectangles or thick bars)
represent a change of state which is caused by events or
actions.
 A set of arcs (drawn as arrows) connecting a place to a
transition and vice versa.
 Tokens (drawn as black dots) occupy places to
represent the truth of the associated condition.
TABLE.II. FORMAL DEFINITION OF A PETRI NET 
A Petri net is 5-tuple, PN=(P,T,F,W,M0) where: 
P={p1, p2,…,pm} is a finite set of places, 
T={t1,t2,…,tn} is a finite set of transitions, 
F  (P X T) U (T X P) is a set of arcs (flow relations), 
W:F  {1, 2, 3,…} is a weight function, 
M0:P  {0, 1, 2, 3,….} is the initial marking, 
P ∩ T= ø and  P U T ≠ ø. 
A Petri net structure N=(P, T, F, W) without any specific initial 
marking is denoted by N. 
A Petri net with the given initial marking is denoted by (N,M0). 
Our technique involves simulation and verification by 
using Time-arc Petri nets. Initially, we build a PN model for 
client-server without intruder using TAPAAL simulation and 
verification software [37]. Moreover, it is worth to consider 
the following: 
a) Define the places and transitions and declare their
functionalities 
b) Implement a token passing scheme once the initial
marking is set. 
c) Assess the model behaviour by examine reachability,
boundedness, liveness. 
The Petri net model in Fig. 2 represents the proposed 
protocol. The definitions of the places and transitions used in 
this model are illustrated in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. 
In our PN model, places mostly represent storage for 
requests, messages, ciphers, or session keys. Transitions 
represent actions that transform a current state to a new one. 
For example, the following events produce a new state: 
encryption, decryption, verification, and computations. Tokens 
are modelled in PN as shown in Fig. 2 to represent the key 
agreement and message exchange between the client and 
server. During simulation, the token firing rule imitates the 
three-way handshake procedure.   
TABLE.III. DEFINITIONS OF PLACES FOR THE PROPOSED MODEL 
Place Definition Place Definition 
P1 Client random number P14 Encrypted SYN/ACK 
P2 Client timestamp P15 Decrypted SYN/ACK 
P3 SYN request P16 Verification message 
P4 Login request P17 Rejected request 
P5 Encrypted login request P18 
Accept request – Server is 
authenticated 
P6 Decrypted login req. P19 Session key 
P7 Verification message P20 ACK 
P8 Rejected request P21 Encrypted ACK 
P9 Accepted request P22 Decrypted ACK 
P10 Server random number P23 Verification message 
P11 Server timestamp P24 Rejected request 
P12 Session Key P25 Accept request – Client  
P13 SYN/ACK is authenticated 
TABLE.IV. DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITIONS FOR PROPOSED MODEL 
Trans. Definition Trans. Definition 
T1 Compute login request + 
SYN 
T10 Split the packet and 
verify 
T2 Encrypt T11 Drop the packet 
T3 Decrypt T12 Accept 
T4 Split the packet and verify T13 Compute ACK and 
session key 
T5 Drop the request T14 Encrypt ACK 
T6 Accept T15 Decrypt ACK 
T7 Compute SYN/ACK and 
session key 
T16 Split the packet and 
verify 
T8 Encrypt SYN/ACK T17 Drop the packet 
T9 Decrypt SYN/ACK T18 Accept 
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Fig.2. The Petri net graph representing the new protocol. 
After modeling the proposed protocol, it is essential to 
examine the behavioral properties of the model. Detailed 
behavioral properties for Petri nets can be found in [35]. 
Generating Reachability graph (Fig. 3) allows identifying the 
presence and absence behaviors of the modeled protocol. 
A. Reachability: 
Reachability or coverability can be conducted by 
numerating all states. In other words, deriving all the possible 
marking the protocol can reach in the model.  This method can 
clearly identify all the enabled transition starting from the 
initial state and generating new states after firing transitions. 
The PN shown in Fig. 2 is bounded. This is evident from the 
reachability graph (Fig. 3), all set of reachable marking Mi, 
where i={0,1,2,…,19} are said to be reachable, that is to say 
there exists a sequence of transition firings which transform 
one marking state to another.  
B. Boundedness and safeness: 
Boundedness helps to detect overflows in the modeled 
system. This property is an indication of stability behavior of 
model. It is evident that the proposed PN is structurally 
bounded, for each place in the net hold at most 2 tokens given 
an initial marking m0, that is to say that there are a finite 
number of states in the modeled protocol. Thus, the PN has no 
self-loop and satisfies the condition [35]: 
A Petri net is k-bounded if all its places are k-bounded 
A Petri net is structurally bounded if it is bounded in any 
initial marking   
Hence, We can say that the PN is structurally 2-bounded, 
however, the PN is not safe because there are two nodes (P1, 
P2) contains more than one token. It does not fulfill the 
safeness condition, which is 1-boundedness. 
Fig.3. Reachability graph for proposed model 
C. Liveness 
The PN has a finite number of dead markings. The 
transitions (T5, T11, T17) connected to places (P8, P17, P24) 
respectively are not live if the protocol runs smoothly. Apart 
from that, the rest of places and their corresponding firing 
transitions are live. Occurrence of deadlocks (Rejection state) 
as shown in Fig. 3 is a result for aborting the current session 
between the client and serve; the token age exceeds the 
deadline.   
Since PN contains deadlocks and not live, then the PN is 
considered not reversible.  
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISIONS
The analysis suggests that the proposed scheme is well-
designed for data confidentiality by using symmetric 
P={P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, 
P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, 
P17, P18, P19, P20, P21, P22, P23, 
P24, P25} 
T = {T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, 
T9, T10, T11, T12, T13, T14, T15, T16, 
T17, T18} 
M0: {2, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,0} 
Client-side Server-side 
R= Rejection State
M0 P1 P2 P3 P10P11 
is authenticat 1
P4 P10 P11 
is 
P5 P10 P11 
is 
P6 P10 P11 
is 
P7 P10 P11 
is 
T1
T2
T3
T4
P9 P10 P11
is 
P8 P10 P11 
T5 T6
T7
  P12 P13 
is 
  P16is 
authentic
  P15is 
authentic
   P14 is 
authentic
T8
T9
T10
  P17is 
authe
P18 P1 P2 
T12T11
   P19 P20s 
is 
T13
T14
  P21
  P22
  P23
T15
T16
P24 
auth
  P25
T17 T18
R 
R 
R 
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cryptography during the handshake procedure.  Also, it 
ensures data integrity by applying a Message Authentication 
Code function (MAC). Typically, the MAC function takes as 
input a secret key and data block and produces a hash value 
[38]. The client and server transmit the MAC value during the 
login and authentication phases. However, both client and 
server will be aware if an attacker alters the message because 
the integrity check of MAC value fails. When the 
communication session between Ci and Si is over, the session 
key sk is discarded and a new session key is used in every 
protocol run to prevent a replay attack.  
Mutual authentication and session key agreement 
Based on FSM model and PN model, we proved that the 
protocol accomplished mutual authentication and secret 
session key agreement between a remote client and the server 
by establishing three-way challenge-response handshake 
technique. First, the client Ci sends the login request message 
{IDCi, TCi, W1, M3, MACk(IDCi, TCi, W1, M3)} to the server Si.
Then Si verifies the received message by checking the MAC 
integrity. After validating, Si sends a challenge message {IDCi,
TSi, W2, M6, M7, MACk(IDCi, TSi, W2, M6, M7)} to Ci. Next, Ci
check the validity of the received message M7 ≟ H4 (M4 || rCi)
and accept or reject the server request according to the 
verification result. Finally, Ci sends a response message M9 = 
H4(H4(IDCi|| y)  rSi) || rSi) to Si. Upon receiving the message,
Si verifies if M9 ≟ H4 (M6 || rSi) holds. If so, Si authenticates
client Ci and allows him to get access.  During the process, 
both Si and Ci compute the session key sk = H3(IDCi, TCi, TSi,
W1, W2, (rSi .rCi .P)) successfully.
Denial-of-service-attack 
Our scheme can withstand denial-of-service attack, 
because when the client Ci imprints personal biometrics Bio
*
Ci
,
the Si will check the validity of Bio
*
Ci
 with stored template by
checking whether d(BioCi, Bio
*
Ci
)  < τ holds. According to [31],
the Bio*Ci could pass the verification process even though there
is some slight difference between BioCi, Bio
*
Ci
.
As for the computation cost, the proposed protocol is 
relatively low cost and efficient since only symmetric 
encryption; hash operations and XOR operations are required. 
Moreover, it is based on ECC which has significant 
advantages over other public-key cryptography. ECC provides 
the same security level of RSA cryptosystem but with a 
shorter key length and faster computation [39] 
In Table 5, we summarised the performance and 
demonstrated comparisons between the proposed scheme and 
other related schemes. The evaluation parameters are defined 
in Table 6. Even though the number of operations is more than 
in other schemes, our scheme holds other security properties. 
The proposed protocol is based on a two-factor user 
authentication mechanism and it is obvious that it takes few 
more hash operations and XOR operations for the server and 
client. Due to the security weaknesses in related schemes, we 
applied symmetric encryption and symmetric decryption to 
ensure the confidentiality and the integrity of transmitted 
packets.  Therefore this feature makes the proposed scheme 
effective. 
TABLE.V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS 
He et al.’s 
Scheme 
Li-Hwang’s 
Scheme 
Proposed Scheme 
Client 2TH + 2TMAC 3TH + 3TX 
6TH + 3TX + 3TMAC 
+ 2TSE + TSD 
Server 4TH + 2TMAC 4TH + 2TX 
6TH  + 2TX + 3TMAC 
+ 1TSE + 2TSD 
TABLE.VI. EVALUATION PARAMETERS 
Symbol Definition 
TX Time for executing an XOR operation 
TH Time for executing a one-way hash function 
TMAC Time for executing a message authentication code 
TSE 
Time for executing a symmetric encryption 
operation 
TSD 
Time for executing a symmetric decryption 
operation 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The paper demonstrates how a combination of ID-based 
encryption with biometrics can be effective and more suited to 
e-Government environments. Moreover, the new biometric-
identity-based scheme can be integrated into e-Government 
systems as the main authentication method and for secure 
communication as well. The proposed scheme is aimed to 
initiate secure authentication and communication between the 
client and server by building a robust mechanism between 
communicating government parties. The presented protocol is 
described as a three-way handshake procedure to establish a 
reliable connection and ensure secure data sharing.  Moreover, 
we have simulated and validated the behaviour of the proposed 
protocol by using finite-state machines and Petri nets.  
In future, an in-depth security analysis and evaluation will 
be conducted to thoroughly assess for security vulnerabilities 
and weaknesses. Furthermore, it is essential to consider using 
Petri Nets to add an intruder model and implement a token-
passing scheme. At this stage, we will examine different 
attacks, such as impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle 
attack, and replay attack against the proposed scheme and 
verify its security.  
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